CASE STUDY
A 48-year-old concert pianist was diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). Within 1 year of symptom onset, he lost his ability to perform, which was his life's passion. He became dependent upon others for all activities of daily living, including personal hygiene.
His wife was consumed by her own professional career. Their relationship deteriorated precipitously as his dependency further intruded into her personal lifestyle. She became vocally resentful and punitive in her behaviors. For a period of 8 months he was left alone at home for protracted periods with infrequent companionship.
Despite his circumstances, he remained stoic and noncomplaining during clinic visits. He would occasionally admit to anxiety but repeatedly denied more than fleeting feelings of depression. He expressed skepticism that formal counseling or psychiatric referral would benefit him. He consented to and received lorazepam and sertraline.
Eventually, home care became untenable and he was admitted to a hospice facility. He expressed the belief that life had lost all meaning for him. He wished to stop eating and drinking. A psychiatric consultant felt that this represented an expression of despair and recommended treatment with stimulants. When the patient refused, the psychiatrist recommend placement of a nasogastric tube for drug delivery.
When visited by his neurologist with whom he had a long-standing rela-tionship, his personality was radically transformed. He was uncharacteristically vocal and critical and expressed a feeling that he had lost control. A vital capacity of 20% predicted and sentences interrupted by shallow inspirations led his neurologist to believe that life expectancy was limited to a matter of days. His intent to stop eating and drinking was perceived as a rational response to his medical and social circumstances by his neurologist. Transfer was arranged to an acute care hospital where sufficient sedation was provided to ensure that further suffering would not occur. Prior to the administration of sedation, the patient was noted to have reverted to his baseline affable and noncritical personality.
DISCUSSION

Is an Imminently Dying Patient's Desire to Expedite Death Indicative of Mental Illness?
The historical psychiatric construct of depression would argue that requests to hasten death are de facto evidence of depression associated with an impaired capacity for rational decision making. Among terminally ill patients with cancer, interest in hastening death has been estimated at less than 25% (Breibart et al, 2000; Chochinov et al, 1999; Emanuel et al, 2000; Tiernan et al, 2002) , the largest study by Emanuel and colleagues reporting 10% admitting to a serious interest in suicide or euthanasia. This interest in hastened death appears to correlate with depression (Breibart et al, 2000; Chochinov et al, 1999) .
This correlation needs to be interpreted cautiously. Detection of depression in the imminently dying is difficult. Many of the vegetative symptoms of depression may overlap with symptoms of the disease itself. In addition, ''the symptoms that are most important for the diagnosis of depression may not be the same as the symptoms that are most critical in determining the effect of the depression on decision making capacity'' (Sullivan and Youngner, 1994) .
In addition, an imminently dying individual's request to hasten his or her death may be misconstrued as suicidal ideation. Many, perhaps most, terminally ill patients do not wish to die. Rather, they may simply view death as the most preferable of their limited remaining options. If a desire for hastened death is misconstrued as being synonymous with suicidal ideation, a circular and flawed logic system is initiated. As suicidal ideation is a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) criterion for depression, all individuals requesting a hastened death in this context would be defined as depressed.
Do Depressive Symptoms in Imminently Dying Patients Nullify Their Capacity for Decision Making and Self-determination?
In the United States, there is a strong legal and ethical consensus that a patient with decision-making capacity has both a legal and ethical right to refuse medical intervention, including food and water. From both a legal and moral perspective, patients are presumed to maintain the capacity for decision making until proven otherwise. Autonomy is dependent on informed consent, which in turn is dependent on a patient's capacity for decision making. According to Blank and colleagues (2001), ''There is compelling evidence that severe depression may undermine a patient's capacity to make decisions about life-sustaining treatments.'' This position is not universally held. ''That the terminally ill may be entirely reasonable in their desire for an early death as a means to end their suffering'' was first suggested in 1971 (McKegney and Lange, 1971) . A similar perspective is provided by others. ''The presence of a major depressive disorder is neither necessary nor sufficient for the impairment of competence.'' Furthermore, ''it is essential,'' in the estimation of Sullivan and Youngner (1994), ''for psychiatrists to accept that a seriously ill person's choice to die may be rational, especially in situations where the medical prognosis is very poor.''
What Constitutes an Adequate Trial of Treatment in Imminently Dying Patients With Depressive Symptoms, and to What Lengths May a Physician Go to Provide That Treatment?
There is a general consensus that individuals with a major depression can be effectively treated, even in the context of terminal illness (Breitbart et al, 2000) . Eighty percent of depressed patients with cancer responded to antidepressants in one study (Lloyd-Williams, 2000) .
Conversely, there would appear to be little or no research that addresses the effectiveness of antidepressant treatments on either the depression (Lyness, 2004) or attitudes regarding hastened death (Breitbart et al, 2000) of the terminally ill population.
CONCLUSIONS
In ALS, where disease-specific curative treatment is currently lacking, a physician's obligations are to maximize the patient's independent function, safety, quality and control of life to the extent possible. Additionally, palliative care such as relief of suffering and antidepressant treatment should be provided when indicated. Correlates of suffering appear to be increasing pain, poorer quality of life, hopelessness, a sense of burden on caretakers, and level of disability. Correlates of a poor quality of life include a sense of hopelessness as well as a lack of social support (Ganzini et al, 1999) .
The prevalence of major depression in two separate studies of ALS approximated 10% (Ganzini et al, 1999; Rabkin et al, 2005) . Counterintuitively, in Rabkin and colleagues' study, the incidence of depression did not escalate with disease progression.
In studies of ALS, 33% to 56% of patients considered hastening death (Albert et al, 2005; Ganzini et al, 1998) . Neither pain, suffering, nor a perceived poor quality of life appears to correlate with a desire for life-sustaining treatment or an interest in physician-assisted suicide in the ALS population (Ganzini et al, 1999; Ganzini et al, 2002) . In contrast to studies of Breitbart and colleagues (2000) and Chochinov and colleagues (1999) on non-ALS populations, ''major depressive disorders as diagnosed by DSM-III-R criteria months before death (in patients with ALS) did not predict interest in assisted suicide in the last month of life'' (Ganzini et al, 2002) .
In most medical decisions, the benefit of the doubt would favor treating potentially reversible components of a disease process such as hopelessness and depression. Certainly, early in the disease depression should be aggressively sought for and treated in an attempt to improve a patient's quality of life. Even later in the disease course, when the slow onset of action of conventional antidepressant agents may preclude their effectiveness, trials of stimulants may be effective.
Death is inevitable and in this patient's case was imminent. Ideally, in a terminally ill patient, every reasonable attempt to maintain and improve the quality of that patient's life, including treatment of depression, would be exercised. As Olney and Lomen-Hoerth (2005) have implied, however, depression, a pathological and potentially treatable condition, is not synonymous with despair, representing a measured and rational response to a hopeless terminal illness. In the imminently dying, the benefit of the doubt should be to honor the patient's expressed wishes. Coercive delivery of medication in the latter stages of a terminal disease would be unlikely to achieve any meaningful goal and would undoubtedly detract from the remaining dignity of that patient's limited existence. 
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